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We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping the ping-pong quantum communication protocol
proposed by Bostro¨m and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] freely in a noise channel.
The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the
sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in a
same state, and measures the photons return with the measuring basis with which Eve prepares
the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increase neither the quantum channel losses nor
the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the
secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving
the security of the ping-pong protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ta, 89.70.+c
Quantum mechanics offers some unique capabilities for
the processing of information, such as quantum compu-
tation and quantum communication [1]. Quantum cryp-
tography, one of the most mature quantum techniques,
provides a novel way for transmitting of message se-
curely. Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the orig-
inal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in 1984,
a lot of works have been focused on this topic, such as
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. In QKD, the two parties,
say the sender, Alice and the receiver, Bob, can create
a random binary string with quantum channel uncondi-
tionally secure [1]. The no-cloning theorem [13] forbids
any eavesdropper to eavesdropping an unknown quantum
state without disturbing it. In fact, QKD is secure as the
authorized users can find out the eavesdropping done by
Eve if she wants to steal the quantum information, and
then they discard the string, which does not reveal the
secret message.
Recently, a novel concept, quantum secure direct com-
munication (QSDC), was proposed and actively pursued
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
Also, it is extended for controlled teleportation [29].
With QSDC, the secret message is transmitted directly
without first creating a random key to encrypt it, which
is different from QKD whose object is just to establish
a common random key between two remote parties. As
the secret message cannot be altered by the two autho-
rized users when it has been transmitted in the quan-
tum channel, the security of QSDC depends on the fact
that Eve can only get a random outcome if she mon-
itors the line [15, 16, 17]. Moreover, Alice and Bob
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can detect the eavesdropping if Eve monitors the quan-
tum line before they code the message on the quantum
states. By far, almost all the existing QSDC protocols
can be attributed to one of the two types. The first one
are the QSDC protocols in which the secret message can
be read out directly without exchanging an additional
classical information for each qubit except for the sam-
pling qubits for eavesdropping check, such as those in
Refs.[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. The other one are those
protocols in which each qubit can be read out by the le-
gitimate user after at least a bit of classical information
is exchanged [21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. An interesting feature of
the QSDC protocols in Refs. [15, 16, 17] is that the quan-
tum states are transmitted in a quantum data block and
the two legitimate users can maintain its security with
error correction and quantum privacy in a noise channel.
The famous ping-pong QSDC protocol [14] proposed
by Bostro¨m and Felbinger has been claimed to be secure
for establishing a random key and quasisecure for trans-
mitting a plain text message (a secret message) as Eve is
able to gain a small amount of message information be-
fore being detected [14]. Recently, the ping-pong protocol
is proven insecure if the quantum channel losses are high
enough [30, 31, 32] even for distributing a common ran-
dom key. Also it can be attacked without eavesdropping
[33, 34]. In this paper, we will show that the ping-pong
protocol can be eavesdropped freely if the error rate in-
troduced by the quantum channel noise is not zero, not
requiring that the loss of the quantum channel is high.
Moreover, we introduce a way for improving its security
in a noise channel.
In the ping-pong QSDC protocol [14], the message re-
ceiver Bob prepares the quantum source, an Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair. An EPR pair is in one of
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FIG. 1: Schematic demonstration of the ping-pong QSDC
protocol, similar to the figure 1 in the Ref. [17]. Alice is the
sender of message, and Bob is the receiver.
the four Bell states shown as following [1]:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 ± |1〉|0〉),
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉), (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the horizontal and vertical polarized
states of a single photon, respectively. The two photons
in each EPR pair prepared by Bob are in the maximal
entangled state |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉H |1〉T + |1〉H |0〉T ). Here H
and T represent the home qubit and the travel qubit [14],
respectively. Similar to quantum dense coding [35], Bob
keeps the qubit H and sends the qubit T to Alice. Alice
chooses two modes, the control mode and the message
mode, for dealing with the T qubit, i.e., a probability c
for picking up the control mode for the photon and 1− c
for coding the message. When she chooses the control
mode, Alice performs a single-photon measurement on
the T qubit with the horizontal-vertical measuring basis
(MB), say σz , otherwise she codes the photon with I =
|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| and Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1| when the messages
are 0 and 1, respectively.
(Z ⊗ I)|ψ+〉 = |ψ−〉. (2)
Cai introduced an attack way without eavesdropping
[18]. In Cai eavesdropping scheme, Eve measures the T
photon with the MB σz . This attack cannot be detected
if Alice and Bob only take the MB σz on their sampling
photons. In an ideal channel without noise and loss, this
attack cannot get the information about the secret mes-
sage. However, we have to confess that there are noises in
a practical quantum channel which will introduce an er-
ror rate εc in the outcomes [1, 2]. With the improvement
of technology, εc can be small, but not zero. Moreover,
a single-photon detector has a special recovery time (i.e.,
the dead time) [2] in which the N photons attained are
recorded as just one. Eve can exploit the error rate εc
and the recovery time to hide her eavesdropping on the
ping-pong protocol and get almost all the information
about the secret message with a multi-photon fake signal
even though the quantum channel loss is low. We intro-
duce it in detail as following, similar to the Trojan horse
attack in Ref. [2, 36].
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FIG. 2: The state of the multi-photon fake signal. |+ θ〉 and
| − θ〉 are the two eigenstates of the measuring basis σθ.
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FIG. 3: The attack with the photon number splitters (PNS:
50/50) in the case that there are four photons in each fake
signal.
For the eavesdropping, Eve first intercepts and mea-
sures the T photon with MB σz , and then she prepares
anN -photon fake signal with the MB σθ whose two eigen-
states can be written as
|+ θ〉 = cosθ|0〉+ sinθ|1〉,
| − θ〉 = −sinθ|0〉+ cosθ|1〉, (3)
where θ ∈ [0, pi2 ) and
sin2θ ≤ εc. (4)
When the outcome of the measurement is |0〉T , Eve
prepares the N -photon fake signal in the same state
|+ θ〉 = cosθ|0〉+ sinθ|1〉, shown in Fig.2, and resends it
to Alice in a time slot, shorter than the recovery time of
the single-photon detector. As its dead time, Alice’s de-
tector only records a single photon when Alice measures
the signal by choosing the control mode with the MB σz .
In this way, Eve’s eavesdropping will introduce the error
3rate εE = sin
2θ in the sampling instances between Alice
and Bob. Eve can use a better quantum channel with
which the error rate is lower by far than the origin one
to hide her eavesdropping freely.
As an example for demonstrating the principle of this
attack, we assume that εc = 10% and Eve uses an ideal
quantum channel to steal the message below. As the
symmetric, we assume that there are N = 2m photons in
the fake signal.
εE = sin
2θ = εc = 0.1. (5)
After the coding done by Bob with one of the two local
unitary operations I and Z, Eve intercepts the fake signal
again. She splits the multi-photon signal with some pho-
ton number splitters (PNS: 50/50), and sends one photon
to Bob and measures the other photons, see in Fig.3.
If Alice performs the I operation on the fake signal,
the photons in the fake signal are in the state |T ′〉 = |+
θ〉 = cosθ|0〉+ sinθ|1〉; otherwise |T ′〉 = |θ′〉 = cosθ|0〉 −
sinθ|1〉. The attack for obtaining the information about
the local unitary operations done by Alice is simplified to
distinguish those two states. It is impossible for Eve to
get almost all the information about Alice’s operation if
she has only one photon coded by Alice as |〈θ′|+ θ〉|2 =
cos22θ = 0.64. But the story is changed if there are
many photons in each fake signal. Eve can distinguish
those two states with a large probability and then steal
almost all of the message freely.
Fig.3 gives us an example for Eve to eavesdrop the
message with four photons in each fake signal. Eve splits
the fake signal with three PNS when the signal returns
from Alice to Bob. She sends one of the four photons
to Bob and measures the other three photons with the
MB σθ, see Fig.2. If the three photons are all in state
| + θ〉 = cosθ|0〉 + sinθ|1〉, i.e., Alice performs the iden-
tity operation I on the fake signal, Eve gets the out-
come | + θ〉 with the probability 100%; otherwise Eve
has the probability (cos22θ)n−1 = (0.64)3 = 0.262144
to obtain the state | + θ〉 for her measurements on all
the three photons. That is, Eve has the probability
PF = 0.262144 that she will fail to distinguish the two
operations done by Alice on the fake signal. If there are
N photons with which Eve distinguish the two states
| + θ〉 and |θ′〉, the probability that Eve will fail is re-
duced to PF = (cos
22θ)n−1 = (0.64)n−1. When n=64,
PF ∼= 6.16 × 10−13. It means that Eve can obtain the
message fully if there are a large number of photons in
each fake signal as this attack increases neither the signal
losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances.
In essence, the security issue in ping-pong QSDC pro-
tocol [14] arose from the fact that the two authorized
users transmit the qubits one by one and check the eaves-
dropping only with the same MB σz. The secret mes-
sage transmitted cannot be discarded, different from the
outcomes in QKD [2]. For improving its security, it is
necessary for Alice and Bob to transmit the qubits in a
quantum data block, similar to [15, 16, 17], and mea-
sure the sampling instances with two MBs σz and σx.
Here σx = { 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉),
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)}. As the eaves-
dropping check depends on the public statistical analysis
of the sampling instances, the transmission of the quan-
tum data block ensures that the message is coded after
the verification process is accomplished. Moreover, the
two parties can do quantum privacy amplification on the
quantum date [15, 16, 17] before Alice codes her message
on the quantum states. Those two interesting characters
paly an important role in the security of QSDC protocols.
With the two MBs for the sampling instances, the ac-
tion done by the eavesdropper, Eve will leave a trace in
the results and will be detected. Moreover, this modifi-
cation can improve the capacity in the ping-pong QSDC
protocol, as discussed in Ref. [37]. For most of the ex-
isting QSDC protocols, there is a probability that Eve
can get a part of message if she eavesdrops the quantum
channel with a Trojan horse attack strategy [2] and re-
placing the original quantum channel with an ideal one.
In the QSDC protocols [15, 16, 17], the parties can re-
duce the information leaked to Eve to a negligible value
with quantum privacy amplification [2, 15, 16]. Also,
Alice and Bob can prevent Eve from eavesdropping with
this attack if they use some PNS to monitor the sampling
instances. That is, they split the signal with some PNS
and measure them individually with choosing the MB σz
and σx randomly, similar to Ref. [36]. This strategy for
eavesdropping check can also be used to improve the se-
curity in the QKD protocol [5] and the secure determinis-
tic communication protocol [38] proposed by Lucamarini
and Mancini following the ideas in Refs. [5, 16]. In a
practical application, the users can also use some photon
beam splitters to replace the PNSs.
In conclusion we have presented an attack strategy on
the ping-pong QSDC protocol freely in a noise quantum
channel. This attack works for getting the secret mes-
sage transmitted with the ping-pong protocol [14]. The
eavesdropper, Eve can intercept the signal transmitted
between Alice and Bob and measures it first, and then
she replaces it with a multi-photon fake signal. Eve’s
eavesdropping can be hidden by the error rate introduced
by the noise in the practical quantum channel and the
dead time of a detector. She can obtain almost all the
information about the message with some photon num-
ber splitters and measurements along some a direction.
We also suggest the way for improving the security of
the ping-pong protocol and introduce a way for prevent
the eavesdropper from stealing the information with the
Trojan horse attack strategy.
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